OrientXXI – Nov. 19, 2024

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad inherited the alliance between Damascus and Tehran from his father. Over time, this alliance has become a necessity, particularly with the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011. But in the context of the current war in the Middle East, it has become a disturbing burden.

On September 17 and 18, 2024, more than 3,000 pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah exploded. Particularly shocking in their scale, these events were the prelude to the Israeli military operation against the Lebanese militia and sounded the alarm in both Beirut and Damascus.

A month earlier, the director of the Bashar Al-Assad regime’s General Intelligence Department, Major General Hussam Louqa, had made a secret visit to Beirut, where he met with Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem. Louqa had called on Hezbollah to reduce the escalation and not fall into the Israeli trap, given the military risk to both the Lebanese militia and the Syrian regime. Qassem had highlighted Hezbollah’s carefully thought-out, phased strategy and Israel’s weariness after a year of war in the Gaza Strip.

Naim Qassem and Hassan Nasrallah in fact made an error of judgment in dismissing the risk of an Israeli offensive. The latter was assassinated on September 27, and the Assad regime found itself facing its most complex challenge since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, with the stakes of controlling the Syrian-Lebanese border being of strategic importance for Hezbollah and the Iranians, but also for Israel.

The central role of Hezbollah

Iranian leaders believe that a crushing defeat of Hezbollah would have negative consequences for their own national security. The existence of the Lebanese group has until now provided a deterrent to Iran and its nuclear program, as a first line of confrontation and a tool for Tehran to blackmail Israel and the United States. The militia has also played a role in providing technical and logistical support to Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen. Hezbollah also helped save the Assad regime in the early years of the revolution against him, especially between 2012 and 2015. Tehran therefore considers that the rout of Hezbollah would pose a risk to its national security and, in particular, to its nuclear program vis-à-vis Israel. This is why continuing to support Hezbollah across the Syrian-Lebanese border is a strategic priority, whatever the cost. A cost that especially worries Bashar Al-Assad, whose eyes are on Israel.

On the Israeli side, two issues are priorities in the Syrian theater. The first concerns the Syrian-Lebanese border and the second the Iranian-backed militias in Syria. These concerns could become more intense given Tehran and Hezbollah’s refusal to accept defeat and make concessions that would prompt the Israeli government to end its military operation in Lebanon. Tel Aviv is, however, aware of the difficulty of continuing its offensive in the short term, after the American presidential election, despite the re-election of Donald Trump. Hence the decision to attack the porosity of the Syrian-Lebanese border, as evidenced by the recent statement by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: ”We will cut Hezbollah’s oxygen pipeline that connects Iran to Syria.”¹.  »

Three military scenarios

In practice, three military scenarios are on the table of the Israeli government to obstruct this border. The first consists of extending the Israeli military offensive on land on Lebanese territory towards the Bekaa Valley, the regions of Baalbek and Hermel, to control the border. This scenario appears very costly and complex.

The second is to launch a new ground offensive in the southwest of Syrian territory, towards Quneitra, then towards the west of Damascus, towards Qalamoun and Homs, in order to close the border on the Syrian side. This scenario is constrained by the Russian presence in Syria and its costs would be high due to the strong presence of militias supported by Iran.

The third would be for Israel to intensify its airstrikes on both sides of the border. Since the start of the operation against Hezbollah, the Israeli air force has carried out dozens of airstrikes targeting official and unofficial crossing points on the Syrian-Lebanese border. Israel has also assassinated three leaders of Unit 4400, affiliated with Hezbollah and responsible for financing and supplying the group from Syrian territory, the most important of whom, Muhammad Jaafar Qasir, was a close personal associate of Bashar Al-Assad. But the effectiveness of these strikes appears to have been limited.

Based on this observation, Israel warned Assad of the need to take the decision to close these borders. But the latter has not yet responded to this warning, and for good reason.

At the mercy of Tehran

After the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, Iran intervened militarily and directly protected Assad. With its support for military figures running for senior positions and its connections with security service leaders, its influence within the Syrian regime itself grew. Tehran also expanded its relationships with key Syrian businessmen close to the regime. This interference occurred in parallel with the deployment of thousands of Iranian-backed militia fighters from Iraq and Lebanon. Thus, Iran gradually shifted from being an ally protecting Assad to a partner in managing the territory. This reality forces Assad to think carefully before taking any steps that would thwart Iranian interests, including in areas under his control. A possible conflict over a strategic issue with the Iranian leadership could have serious repercussions for the security and economic situation in Syria and, possibly, for Assad himself. Based on these concerns, Assad is knocking on Russia’s door.

This is not the first time that Damascus has asked for Moscow’s help in a crisis involving Tehran that poses a threat to the stability of the Syrian regime. In his book The Lost Novel, former Syrian Vice President for Foreign Affairs Farouk Al-Sharah discusses Hafez al-Assad’s reaction after the outbreak of the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran (1979-1989):

Hafez Al-Assad rushed to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Syria and the Soviet Union on October 8, 1980, which he had always hesitated to sign. This move is a response to this new variable.

During a surprise visit to Moscow in July 2023, Bashar al-Assad met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who told him that the regional situation was deteriorating and that Syria was directly concerned. Yet Russia, despite the war in Ukraine and strategic cooperation with Tehran, still maintains close relations with Israel. Hence the fundamental question for Assad in his dilemma over the Syrian-Lebanese border: will Moscow side with Tehran, Tel Aviv, or Damascus  ?

On September 8, in the Masyaf region, Israeli helicopters conducted a military operation against a facility of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, presumably manufacturing warheads for ballistic missiles. In the Russian base of Khmeimim, located just a few kilometers from this area, a cautious calm reigned. The S-400 air defense batteries of the base, although having identified the Israeli movements, showed no reaction. This is in line with the way Moscow has always tolerated Israeli airstrikes against Iranian interests in Syria. The Russians distinguish their interests in this country from those of Tehran, with the priority being the maintenance of the Syrian regime, and the preservation of their military bases on the Syrian coast, their only outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. Hence the absence of any notable reaction on the part of Russia.

Kremlin Maps

The Soviet Union was not on Iran’s list of allies before Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power or after. During the first Gulf War between Iran and Iraq, the Soviet Union did not supply Tehran with equipment, but supported Baghdad, supplying it with fighter jets, missiles, and munitions. It now appears that Moscow and Tehran have a more complex relationship than their politicians let on. Putin claims that the Islamic Republic is a strategic ally of Russia, and Leader of the Revolution Ali Khamenei emphasizes friendship with Moscow as well as their rapprochement with “the West”. However, behind these statements, contradictions emerge. For example, regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Tehran supports Moscow significantly, supplying medium- and long-range missiles, drones, and ensuring the transfer of technology to manufacture these drones in Russia. But in Yemen, this alliance is different in nature. Despite repeated requests from the Iranians and the Houthis for the supply of Russian-made Yakhont surface-to-sea missiles, Moscow is still hesitant. This hesitation is also reflected in the supply to Tehran of the S-400 system, which the Iranians still hope to urgently obtain from the Kremlin, particularly after the Israeli airstrike of October 26. Russia justifies its position by the complexity of the situation. Relations between Russia and Iran therefore change depending on the file, including in the Syrian theater, where Moscow remains in retreat on the Iranian-Israeli conflict.

By connecting the threads coming from Tehran, Moscow and Tel Aviv to Damascus, Syria finds itself facing an equation that threatens the stability of the Muhajireen Palace (the Syrian presidential palace). The Iranians believe that closing the Syrian-Lebanese border will accelerate the defeat of Hezbollah and threaten their national security. For their part, the Israelis know that in order to weaken Hezbollah and prevent it from restoring its military capabilities, Assad must close its border with Lebanon. The Russians are not prepared to intervene in this conflict. So they are at least trying to understand the intentions of each of the two parties without taking concrete measures, whether to serve as a mediator or, if necessary, to support one of the parties against the other. Assad finds himself alone between an ally who is pushing him into the abyss, another who is observing the scene from a distance and a neighbor who is resolutely serious in his threats.

Assad’s Syria is trapped between these three parties. The assassination of Hassan Nasrallah by the Israelis and that of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on December 4, 2017, by the Houthis—probably with Iranian approval—fuel the latter’s fears. Not to mention that the Israelis see Assad more than ever, not as a president useful to their interests, but as a threat to their national security and their regional projects. But the decision to get rid of him is only possible with the approval of Russian President Vladimir Putin.