After all, what was the target of the Hamas attack? Killing civilians like this indiscriminately and terrorizing the population of Israel?

Based on my observation of the geopolitical reality of the region before October 7, the reaction of Hamas and the statements of its officials after the attack, in addition to the reaction of its allies, it seems that what was planned did not match what happened. On October 7, the plan was for Hamas special forces to attack a series of Israeli army crossings in Gaza, then infiltrate the Gaza Division Command and capture as many military personnel as possible. But because the number of political and military leaders of Hamas, Hezbollah and the IRGC with prior knowledge of the preparations for the October 7 attacks was very limited, the information did not reach the Israeli Secret Service. Thus, Hamas was surprised by two events: The first was a state of loss and confusion that befell the political and military leadership in Israel, which delayed the Israeli response. Second, with almost no resistance from the Israeli military (IDF), the border between the Gaza Strip and surrounding Israeli cities went out of control, prompting other militias and civilians to enter them and increase the toll of the attack. Thus, from a limited, lightning operation, it turned into a random attack with a huge number of victims and hostages. As a result, the situation spiraled out of control and resulted in higher Israeli casualties, which came as a shock to both Hamas and its allies in Iran and Lebanon, confronting them with a new equation they did not want, nor were they prepared for.

Were countries like Iran and Russia involved in Hamas’ plans?

Since October 7, there has been a lot of false information about Moscow’s direct role in Hamas attacks or the provision of military equipment. In my opinion, Moscow was not aware of Hamas’ preparations for the events of October 7 and was surprised, like many countries in the region, but this does not mean that Moscow is not happy watching the events. Putin is well aware that expanding the cycle of engagement in the Middle East means exhausting Washington’s military capabilities worldwide, which will be reflected in its support for Ukraine. For this reason, I believe that politicians in Moscow may be advising their allies in Tehran on the importance of supporting Gaza, but at the same time trying to ensure that the Assad regime does not participate in this escalation so that the presence of Russia in the Syrian port of Tartus is not affected.

Turkey

What is Turkey’s role in this conflict? Will it come back to a long-standing diplomatic conflict with Israel, or is a significant improvement expected after the end of the war?

In the first two weeks of the war between Israel and Hamas, Turkish statements were somewhat moderate, while Turkey’s efforts focused on intense diplomatic moves. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Qatar, Iran, Lebanon and Egypt. The Turkish government attempted to act as a mediator between Hamas leaders based on its territory and the Netanyahu government, which was not taken seriously given Qatar’s leading role in this. However, due to the large popular movement, especially by AKP supporters, to reject the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip, the tone of Turkish officials began to change. In his latest speech to 1.5 million supporters under the title “Support for Palestine” in Istanbul, Turkish President Erdoğan accused the IDF of war crimes and refused to describe Hamas as a terrorist organization. This shift in orientation can be read in several ways, including that Turkey initially did not expect that the Netanyahu government would choose to go to all-out war. That is because Erdoğan did not want to damage his relationship with Israel, which had reached a good point in recent months. These relations were based on common interests in the fields of energy, tourism and technology. But heavy popular pressure from its supporters was the factor that forced the Erdoğan government to cave in and adopt statements of support for Gaza and Hamas.

Regarding the region, the results of Fidan’s visits to the countries there conveyed the message to the Turkish side that the region may be on the verge of a large-scale conflict that may involve Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. For this reason, Turkey did not want to be in a hostile position with its regional neighbors. I believe that this Turkish position will lead to the return of Turkish-Israeli relations to zero and probably will not improve in the short or medium term, which may have a positive effect on the Israeli rapprochement with Nicosia and Athens.

Netanyahu’s goals

What does Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now seek?

The War Cabinet, headed by Netanyahu, launched the ground operation despite threats from Iran, its allies and militias in the region, and despite domestic, Arab, and even American pressure. Netanyahu knows very well that any interruption of this operation before it achieves its goals will be considered a defeat. Its goals are to end the missile capabilities of Hamas and other militias, destroy their tunnel networks, purge Hamas’ military and political leaders, and deal a major blow to its military capabilities, ultimately resolving the issue of hostages.

Does the US have plans for the Middle East?

Politicians in the White House do not hide their rejection of any expansion of the conflict, beyond the borders of Israel and Gaza. This trend is clear in Biden’s statements and was confirmed by the State Department. Currently, the Biden administration is working on three paths to prevent this expansion: The first is to continue the negotiations Qatar is conducting to find a way out of the Hamas hostage issue. The second is to send messages of calm and threats to both Iran and Hezbollah. The third is to increase the level of military readiness of US and Israeli forces by deploying two aircraft carriers, a number of warships and additional squadrons of F-15/16 aircraft.

“The End of Hamas”

Will the balances and alliances in the region change after the events?

There is no doubt that the region is headed for change, the most important of which is that Israel before October 7 will not be the same as after. The end of Hamas in Gaza, in my opinion, will only be the beginning of another military drive in the West Bank against the Palestinian militias, which will put Israel in a more comfortable position to deal with Hezbollah’s threats in Lebanon and Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, we can say that the understandings and rules of engagement that govern the area no longer apply. We are moving towards drawing new rules of engagement. For this reason we have to wait a while before we can read the directives of Iran and its allies. Will he choose immediate confrontation after the invasion of Gaza or will he wait for Israel’s next move?

Can Cyprus and Greece have a role in this context? Can they influence developments?

In my opinion, both Nicosia and Athens should wait and watch events carefully because of the possibility that the circle of conflict may expand to include Lebanon and Iran. But after the end of this war, Nicosia and Athens are likely to benefit from the tension in Turkish-Israeli relations on the maritime and energy borders, but also in diplomacy. It is also likely that the tension between Ankara and Washington will increase, which will increase the opportunities of Nicosia and Athens.

Moscow and Beijing

There are winners and losers in the international arena. For example, will China, USA, Russia, EU and other major powers lose or win from this war?

At the top of the losers will be Hamas itself, whose presence in Gaza is very likely to be ended, marking the end of its role in the region. Iran will be the other loser, as it will lose the most important pressure and blackmail card against Israel, especially in the file of negotiations on its nuclear program. The winner of this war is Moscow, which believes that Washington’s preoccupation with supporting Israel will distract it from supporting Ukraine, or at least reduce the supply of weapons to the Ukrainian military. Beijing also believes that immersing Washington in another Middle East war will give it more freedom of movement in the China Sea.

What do you think the next day will be in the area of ​​Israel and Palestine based on what we see unfolding?

In my opinion, Gaza will not return to what it was before October 7. There are two scenarios currently being worked out: The first is to move Gazans at a later stage to refugee centers on Egyptian territory. The second is to move the residents to temporary refugee centers in southern Israel and then support the Palestinian Authority to return to the Gaza Strip to manage it alongside continued security coordination with the Israeli government.